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Introduction
This article consists of a six-part study into the attorney-client
privilege as it applies to the modern corporate client. Parts One and
Two focus on the history, purpose, effect and traditional formulations
of the attorney-client privilege. Sections Three and Four analyze prece-
dent applying the privilege to the corporate client at the national level,
with a separate look into Florida state courts and former Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals applications prior to the inception of the new Elev-
enth Circuit. The succeeding sections involve a critical analysis of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn v. United States,1
focusing primarily on the rationale supporting the Court's decision and
the effect Upjohn will have on the corporate client.
The Attorney-Client Privilege
Throughout history, man's insatiable quest for truth has been con-
ceptualized in two distinct procedural forums: the adversarial process;
and the inquisitorial process. Excepting Frederick the Great of Prussia
and Lenin, few political leaders have adopted the inquisition, preferring
instead the adversary system, pitting man against man.2 Government
officials, in the adversary system, generally have been used only as
referrees, maintaining a separateness from the adversary's participation
in the process.
Anglo-American jurisprudence reflects this philosophy in the
strictest sense, demanding injury-in-fact between adversaries and full
disclosure of all pertinent facts. 3 The concept of a privilege against dis-
1. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
2. D. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 389 (2d ed. 1977).
3. "The guiding philosophy behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particu-
larly the discovery rules, is disclosure." Milstein, Attorney-Client Privilege And The
Work Product Doctrine: Corporate Applications, 22 CORP. PRAC. SERIES (BNA) A-1
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closure apparently conflicts with this philosophy. Since the sixteenth
century, however, there has existed the oldest of testimonial privileges,
the attorney-client privilege, which cloaks certain communications be-
tween client and attorney with immunity from disclosure.'
For a privilege against disclosure to be recognized at law the fol-
lowing four conditions must exist:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered. [and]
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.'
The genesis of the original attorney-client privilege embodied the
purpose of protecting the honor of the attorney and his oath of secrecy
to his client by not forcing him to divulge his confidential communica-
tions.6 By the end of the eighteenth century this underlying justification
started eroding from within, however, as professional jealousies devel-
oped from the hodge-podge labeling of privileges as exclusionary rules.'
Consequently, the courts were convinced to disregard application of the
attorney-client privilege to all of the lawyer's relationships.8
The attorney-client privilege is not an exclusionary rule and should
(1980); the goal secured by this philosophy is the "free and unobstructed search for the
truth." This goal must be continually balanced with "the right and absolute necessity
for confidential disclosure of information by the client to its attorney to gain the legal
advice sought thereby," before the scope of the privilege can be ascertained. Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963), rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
5. Id. § 2285, at 527.
6. Id. § 2290, at 543.
7. D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
430 (4th ed. 1981).
8. Id.
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss4/4
Privileged Corporate Communications
not be considered as such.9 It may, "by chance of litigation become,
[an] exclusionary rule; but this is incidental and secondary. Primarily
. . . [it is] a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in
certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or
supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping. 10
Recent critics of the attorney-client privilege, however, are still
quick to label it as an exclusionary rule of evidence in an attempt to
discredit its fundamental importance to the judicial system. 1 Such
spurious generalization, however, undermines the modern purpose of
the attorney-client privilege. This purpose encourages a client's "full
disclosure to his attorney by removing the .. fear of having such con-
fidential communication divulged under judicial compulsion. ' 12
Whereas the original privilege operated as the attorney's protectionist
device to insure the honor of the profession, the new theory focuses on
the client's fears. Thus the modern privilege belongs to the client, not
the attorney. 13 The client may invoke the privilege to protect his confi-
dential disclosures regardless of his relationship to the particular cause
or the attorney's desire to divulge the communications. 4
While the privilege is "designed to secure the client's confidence in
the secrecy of his communications,"1 5 the purpose behind such a privi-
lege is not thwarted by allowing for its voluntary relinquishment.
Therefore the client may waive the legal protections afforded by the
privilege at any juncture of the lawyer-client relationship.16 It is signifi-
9. Id. at 428.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Milstein, supra note 3, at A-1. "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need
for the advocate and the counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.'" Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). The Supreme Court has recognized the purpose
of the privilege "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
13. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950); J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2292, at 554, § 2321, at 629.
14. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2321, at 629. This rule is not absolute, how-
ever. See the FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE, § 90.502(2)(e) (1979) of the Florida Statutes,
which states in part that an attorney may invoke the privilege on behalf of his client.
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cant to note that this right to waive "belongs solely to the client and
not to the attorney."17
The conscientious advocate must keep in mind that the attorney-
client privilege is not a rule excluding evidence from admission into a
court record; rather it is a substantive right granting the client immu-
nity from divulging particular confidences communicated to his attor-
ney. This fundamental difference emphasizes that the nucleus of the
privilege is the client's substantive state rights: a concept that must be
understood before a logical prediction can be made concerning the ap-
plication and scope of the privilege. While making decisions concerning
the availability of the attorney-client privilege it is mandatory for the
advocate to balance the client's right to protect his confidential commu-
nications with the procedural requirement of full disclosure., The ad-
judicative forum must be considered in this decision-making process.
For example, rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that a
federal court decide most privilege questions in accordance with "the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience."1 9 Con-
versely, in a civil action where state law controls the rule of decision
concerning an element of a claim or defense, questions regarding privi-
lege, "shall be determined in accordance with state law."20
General Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Dean Wigmore's formulation of the attorney-client privilege has
gained widespread recognition. 21 According to Wigmore, the following
elements are prerequisites for application of the attorney-client
privilege:
17. Id. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888), for an extensive discussion
on the process of voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege by the client.
18. Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 324.
19. FED. R. EvID. 501. Although the federal courts will apply federal common
law, they cannot agree upon the proper common-law privilege to apply. See Monarch
Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
20. FED. R. EvID. 501. See also Milstein, supra note 3, at A-2. Courts will apply
federal privilege law "in civil actions involving application of federal law" (e.g. anti-
trust, securities, and patent suits). Id.
21. J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2292, at 554.
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1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, 3) the communications relat-
ing to that purpose, 4) made in confidence 5) by the client, 6) are
at his instance permanently protected 7) from disclosure by himself
or by the legal adviser, 8) except the protection [may] be waived. 2
Another general formulation of the privilege receiving frequent ci-
tation appeared in Judge Wyzanski's opinion from United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.23 In a civil anti-trust action where the
defendant corporation objected to the introduction of nearly 800 exhib-
its on the grounds that they fell within the attorney-client privilege, the
court held a matter privileged when:
(1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in con-
nection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the com-
munication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a)
by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the pur-
pose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for
the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client."'
"The beginning point [in understanding the applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege] is the fundamental principle that the public has
the right to every man's evidence, and exemptions from the general
duty to give testimony that one is capable of giving are distinctly ex-
ceptional. ' '25 An exemption will become justified "if - and only if -
policy requires it be recognized when measured against the fundamen-
tal responsibility of every person to give testimony." 26
22. Id.
23. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See H. PITT & H. WACHTELL, PRESERV-
ING CORPORATE CONFIDENTIALITY IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 327 (2d ed. 1981).
24. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
25. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971). See also, J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2192, at 70.
26. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1100.
6211
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The Privilege Applied to the Corporate Client
Although the Supreme Court recognized the attorney-client privi-
lege in the 1880's,27 it was not judged applicable (arguably) to the cor-
porate client until 1915.128 A landmark case from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Associa-
tion,29 reflects the modern view toward the availability of the privilege
for the corporate client. Radiant Burners was a private civil action al-
leging violations of the Sherman Act by American Gas Association.
The court held that "based on history, principle, precedent and public
policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to
corporations ... ."30
As a keystone to predicting future application of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege to the corporate client, it is important to understand the
court's rationale for its holding in Radiant Burners. In the court's view,
the ultimate objective of the privilege is to "facilitate the administra-
tion of justice by encouraging full disclosure by the client to its attor-
ney."' 31 Although Radiant Burners reflects the typical balance of fed-
eral and state interests, as a federal nondiversity action the federal
common law privilege was utilized instead of state law.32 The court in
Radiant Burners declined an invitation to decide a blanket privilege for
corporations, holding that the applicable privilege must be decided on a
case-by-case basis by "balancing the competing goals of the free and
unobstructed search for the truth with the right and absolute necessity
for confidential disclosure of information by the client to its attorney to
gain the legal advice sought thereby. .. .
Availability of the attorney-client privilege for the corporate client
27. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
28. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
29. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), rev'g 207
F. Supp. 771 (N.D. I11. 1962).
30. Id. at 323.
31. Id. at 322.
32. It should be noted here, however, that there was no state law, codified or
judicial, addressing the problem of applying the attorney-client privilege to corpora-
tions. Id. at 319. In other nondiversity federal actions the courts have used state law
when it was available. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1100.
33. 320 F.2d at 324.
1622 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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is made more complex due to choice of law problems." The former
Fifth Circuit recognized this problem in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,3 5
where it held that "[tihe privilege does not arise from the position of
the corporation as a party but its status as a client."3 In Garner, a
class action suit was brought by stockholders against the corporation
for alleged violations of federal and state securities laws. The court
held "that the choice of law cannot be settled by reference to any sim-
ple talisman, but can be arrived at only after a consideration of state
and federal interests that are inseparable from the factors bearing on
the availability of the privilege itself."' 37 Those factors bearing on the
availability of the privilege have become the basis for discord among
the federal and state judiciaries. As a result various combinations of
interests have been advocated and many have been adopted. Although
the Supreme Court of the United States recognizes a need, it refuses to
standardize the attorney-corporate client privilege, emphasizing that
those cases can only be decided on a "case-by-case basis." 38
While, as stated, availability of the attorney-client privilege for the
corporate client has been judicially accepted, there is much disagree-
ment concerning the proper scope of that privilege. Recognizing that a
"corporation can communicate only through its human agents, the...
question arises: which individuals may 'be' the corporation for purposes
of the attorney-client privilege?" 39 Other courts have phrased this di-
lemma as "how far down the corporate table of organization [does] the
privilege extend[?]"'
If a corporation is deemed to communicate only through its human
agents, then only those agents "deemed to personify the corporation
may invoke the corporate privilege. ' 41 Who, then, personifies the corpo-
34. See 2 B. BARRON & G. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
967, at 241-44 (Wright ed. 1961).
35. See generally 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 1097.
37. Id.
38. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981). This approach appears
consistent with the rationale espoused by the Seventh Circuit in Radiant Burners, 320
F.2d 314.
39. United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 42 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
40. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 613 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (1978).
41. Milstein, supra note 3, at A-5.
7
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ration to the extent required to invoke the privilege? The courts are
divided on this issue. Although two primary tests are used to determine
the scope of the privilege, in practice they actually form only the
boundaries within which the courts operate. The test used by the ma-
jority of jurisdictions, and the most restrictive of the two, is the con-
trol-group test."2 This test, originally authored by Judge Kirpatrick in
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Co.,43 held that an em-
ployee sufficiently personified the corporation for purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege:
if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority. .. .
In every other case "the employee would be merely giving information
to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in the corporation
having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice."' 45
Although the control-group test is the majority view, it is rapidly
losing support, being forced to give way to less restrictive and more
realistic views. One of the most striking criticisms of the control-group
test is that it does not provide for privileged communications between
middle-level or lower-level management and counsel. 46 The Eighth Cir-
cuit noted this flaw in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,'47 hold-
ing that: "In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information
relevant to a legal problem from middle management and nonmanage-
ment personnel as well as from top executives."' 8 A strict reading of
42. Id.
43. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id.
46. See Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Cor-
porations in The Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339 (1972), for a critical analysis of
the control-group test. But see Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (Con-
trol group includes managers and assistant managers of patent division and research
and development department).
47. 572 F.2d 596.
48. Id. at 608-09. The ability to "glean" this information from those who are in
Nova Law Journal
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the control-group test, wouldt require tlhat such communications not be
privileged.
The Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States'9 recently decided
not to use the control-group test, holding that it "frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render
legal advice to the client corporation."' 0 The Court further explained
that there may be instances when the attorney's advice will be more
significant to "noncontrol group members than to those who officially
sanction the advice, [indicating that] . . . the control-group test makes
it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees
who will put into effect the client corporation's policy."51 Keeping in
mind that corporations, quite unlike individuals, "constantly go to law-
yers to find out how to obey the law," 52 the application of the control-
group test seems to encompass an unrealistic view of the business com-
munity in general. Nevertheless, this test continues to enjoy widespread
popularity in its application. 3
possession of it poses a problem for the attorney as well as the client. The privilege
exists not only to protect "the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it
but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and in-
formed advice." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. See also the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSImILITY, EC 4-1 (1980), which states: "A lawyer should be fully informed of
all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advan-
tage of our legal system." The incentive to perform this investigation might be lost
were the attorney to suspect that his inquiry had uncovered confidential communica-
tions that could become the subject of discovery.
49. 449 U.S. 383.
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id.
52. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus.
LAW 901, 913 (1969).
53. The Tenth Circuit used this test in Natta, 392 F.2d 686; the Sixth Circuit
used it in Upjohn v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). The Sixth Circuit was reversed on the particular facts of the Upjohn case only.
The Supreme Court explicitly refused to espouse any "blanket-privilege law"; hence
the effect of this decision on the Sixth Circuit's use of the control-group test remains
uncertain. "Many district courts in other circuits have also applied the test," Milstein,
supra note 3, at A-6 (citing Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md.
1974); United States v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
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The subject-matter test is another approach receiving widespread
jurisdictional support. This test, holding the content of the communica-
tion to be determinative of its status with regard to a privilege rather
than the corporate rank of the communicator, found its origin in the
Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.5 In a
complex civil anti-trust action alleging horizontal price fixing by
twenty-three defendants, the court held certain defense memoranda
privileged communications when:
an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his com-
munication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superi-
ors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment.55
Another criticism of the control-group test attacks the very basis of its foundation,
Judge Kirpatrick's reasoning in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F.
Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Attorneys writing as amici curiae for petitioners in Upjohn
condemned the control-group test and Judge Kirpatrick's interpretation of Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Brief Amici Curiae On Behalf Of The American College
Of Trial Lawyers And 33 Law Firms In Support Of Petitioners; Submitted To The
Supreme Court Of The United States, No. 79-886, For The Case Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), at 19 n.16. [Hereinafter cited as Brief Amici Curiae].
The content of the brief argues that Judge Kirpatrick's decision in City of Philadel-
phia reflected a misguided reliance on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hickman. Their position stresses that Kirpatrick found the Hickman decision to be
dispositive as to the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege by holding that
when a corporate executive "communicates a fact relative to pending litigation to a
lawyer retained or employed by the corporation . . . the employee is merely a witness
.," and as such his statements to the lawyer are not privileged. City of Philadel-
phia, 210 F. Supp. at 485. The Court in Hickman, however, specifically refused "to
delineate the content and scope of [the attorney-client] . . . privilege as recognized in
the Federal Courts." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508. Any reliance upon that decision for a
disposition of the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege would be unjustified.
Brief Amici Curiae at 19 n.16.
54. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), arfd per curiam by an equally divided court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971).
55. Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
1 626 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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Although the subject-matter test is considered to be more reflec-
tive of the realities of modern corporate life, its broader blanketing of
communications has been limited by at least one federal circuit. The
Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. held the subject-matter
test appropriate only if:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the re-
quest so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-
ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the em-
ployee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. 6
A common criticism of the subject-matter test is its apparent'con-
flict with the limitations imposed on the work product doctrine by the
United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.5 7 The Seventh
Circuit (in Harper & Row), ingeniously averted running afoul with the
Hickman limitations, explaining that the privilege does not cover "the
communications of employees about matters as to which they are virtu-
"158ally indistinguishable from bystander witnesses ... .
56. 572 F.2d at 609.
57. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court in Hickman recognizes that "[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-
tion." Id. at 507. (Statements of witnesses to a tugboat accident, though the product of
an attorney, prepared while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation, were sub-
ject to discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 only upon a showing that
denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of the adversary's
case or cause him any hardship or injustice).
The Work Product Doctrine established in Hickman, now codified in FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3), must not be confused with the attorney-client privilege. While the privi-
lege belongs to the client, protecting his confidential communications, the work product
doctrine belongs to the attorney as a means of protecting the fruits of his labor. An
attorney may be forced to disclose his work product only upon a showing of good cause
by his adversary. Id. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, The Self-Evaluative
Report Privilege, And Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 699,
701 (1979).
58. Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491. The subject-matter test was criticized by
the Sixth Circuit in Upjohn as enabling "the corporation's management-via agents-to
'communicate' to counsel the details of transactions about which management is only
11
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Many courts have adopted tests of their own, which are combina-
tions of the control-group and subject-matter tests, with characteristics
far less restrictive than the former. For example some federal district
judges in the District of Columbia have adopted their own test, fash-
ioned after the control-group and subject-matter tests. First authored
by Judge Richey in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,59 the follow-
ing requirements must be met before the employee communications can
be claimed within the attorney-client privilege:
1) The particular employee. . . must have made a communication
of information which was reasonably believed to be necessary to
the decision-making process concerning a problem on which legal
advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of
securing legal advice;
3) The subject matter of the communication . . must have been
related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment; and
4) The communication must have been a confidential one .... 60
Another well known analysis, coined the all-employees test, was
authored by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp."1 The court in United Shoe held: "the attorney-client privilege
protects communications of any corporate employee to the corpora-
tion's attorneys where those communications otherwise meet the pre-
requisites for application of the privilege."'6 2 This test is the least re-
dimly aware and to have these communications protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege." 600 F.2d at 1227. This encouraged "senior managers purposely to ignore impor-
tant information they have good business reasons to know and use." Id. This suppos-
edly impedes the liberal exercise of discovery which the modern procedural rules seek
to foster. This argument fails to recognize, however, the "full panoply of discovery
devices made available by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" even in jurisdictions
applying the subject-matter test. Brief Amici Curiae at 19 n.16. E.g., Interrogatories
submitted to an adversary under rule 33 require a response containing the collective
knowledge of agents and employees; rule 34 provides for production of corporate docu-
ments; and rule 30 enables an adversary to depose employees. Id.
59. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
60. Id. at 385.
61. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
62. Milstein, supra note 3, at A-10.
12
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strictive of all and has been criticized as being in direct conflict with
Hickman.63 Despite these criticisms, however, the all-employees test
has found favor in other jurisdictions as well.64
Former Fifth Circuit and Florida State Court Applications of
the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege
The general common law rule that an attorney cannot be forced to
disclose any confidential communications made to him by a client with-
out his client's consent, has long been recognized in Florida. 5 "The
rule is founded on the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, that persons seeking legal aid and counsel should be free to
communicate with their confidential adviser about the subject matter of
their problem without fear . . . of disclosure." 66
The attorney-client privilege has been codified in the Florida Evi-
dence Code providing the client with a privilege of refusal to disclose
those communications made to his attorney when such were intended to
be confidential .6  The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Florida has
also adopted the Radiant Burners application of the attorney-client
privilege to the corporate client,6 8 but neither the Florida state courts,
nor the federal judiciaries within the former Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
63. See supra note 57.
64. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D.
Del. 1954), wherein the court seems to have adopted the all-employees test from
United Shoe. See also United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Evidence And Witnesses § 532, at 156 (1981). Keir v. State,
152 Fla. 389, 11 So. 2d 886 (1943); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Parker, 65 Fla. 543, 62
So. 589 (1913).
66. 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Evidence And Witnesses § 532, at 156, 157 (1981) (citing
81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 172 (1976)).
67. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(a)-(c), (2) (1979) Florida recognizes that the privi-
lege is not absolute and may be outweighed "by public interest in the administration of
justice in certain circumstances." Sepler v. State, 191 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (citations omitted).
68. Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Pledger, 352 So. 2d 85, 88 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977). Although this point was included in Judge Downey's dissenting opinion, it be-
comes clear from a careful reading that the object of the dissent was not related to the
application of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation. Judge Downey was
merely stating that which he knew to be the law in Florida with regard to this issue.
629 1
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cuits have explicitly adopted any particular test with respect to the
scope of this privilege. In fact the Fifth Circuit specifically declined to
choose between the control-group and subject-matter tests.69 A careful
analysis of the precedent on this subject, however, establishes that both
the former Fifth Circuit and the Florida state courts have chosen to
mirror the application set forth in United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp.70 On more than one occasion the Fifth Circuit specifically
adopted the formulation of the general attorney-client privilege from
United Shoe.71 The Fifth Circuit also recognized the importance of
considering state court decisions when deciding the availability and
scope of the attorney-client privilege, especially in light of the vague
guidance provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 501.72
Although Florida state court decisions do not reveal much "blan-
ket-privilege law" concerning this issue, they do show some interesting
corollaries to a less restrictive trend than that evidenced through an
application of the control-group test. For example, Florida courts have
consistently recognized the Hickman work product limitations on wit-
ness' testimony. 73 While inevitable conflict with Hickman remains the
most formidable criticism of the subject-matter and all-employees
tests, 7 4 Florida follows Hickman guidelines, sometimes forcing the dis-
covery of an attorney's work product. 5
Florida courts have also deemed the extent of the attorney-client
privilege to be a matter of state law, indicating that they were not
"bound to follow the [United States] Supreme Court's holding in this
69. See In re Thompson, 624 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit's
decision to pass on this issue was due to their expectation that the Supreme Court
would resolve this matter once and for all in the Upjohn decision that was then pending
before that court. Id. The irony here is that the Supreme Court also refused to resolve
this issue definitively. See infra text accompanying note 82.
70. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
71. See In reGrand Jury Proceedings, 517 F. 2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978).
72. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d at 670.
73. Dupree v. Better Way, Inc., 86 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1956); Nationwide Ins. Co.,
Pinellas County v. Monroe, 276 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
74. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 154 (7th Cir. 1969).
75. Dupree, 86 So. 2d 426; Nationwide Ins. Co., Pinellas County, 276 So. 2d
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regard. ' 6 This adamant stance emphasizes the client's substantive
state rights when balanced with the federal philosophy of full disclo-
sure. With the statutorily guaranteed right to privileged communica-
tion receiving increased emphasis in Florida courts, the federal philoso-
phy toward complete disclosure receives less consideration. The genesis
of the subject-matter and all-employees tests, and the decisions in
Harper & Row and United Shoe respectively, indicate that a need to
protect the client's substantive rights was perceived as giving rise to the
attorney-client privilege. Arguably this perception by Florida courts
represents an intent to apply the less restrictive test when determining
the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 7
The Upjohn Decision
In Upjohn v. United States,7 8 the Internal Revenue Service de-
manded production of questionnaires compiled by Upjohn counsel dur-
ing an in-house investigation of questionable corporate payments to for-
eign government officials.79 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the control-group test, ordering discovery of the documents, but the
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari "to ad-
dress important questions concerning the scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context. ... 8o The circuit court decision
was reversed as the Supreme Court recognized their "task as one of
choosing between two 'tests' which have gained adherents in the courts
of appeals." '81 Attorneys and clients alike awaited a decision that would
finally standardize the applicability of the oldest of testimonial privi-
leges to the corporate client. Such a decision was not forthcoming, how-
ever, as the Court, in practically the same breath that it had recognized
76. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263, 266 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
77. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(b) (1976), "Providing that a 'client' is any per-
son or organization consulting a lawyer to obtain legal services or receiving them from
a lawyer." 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Evidence And Witnesses § 533, at 158 (1981). This rather
liberal definition of a client for purposes of the privilege seems to support this
proposition.
78. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 386.
81. Id.
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its task, held not "to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern
all conceivable future questions in this area ... 82
Although at a glance this decision seems to carry limited potential
for future application,8 a careful reading will reveal that the court not
only fashioned a standard set of guidelines, useful during application of
the privilege, but also strengthened the weakening basis of the modern
attorney-client privilege. They held privileged those communications
concerning "matters within the scope of the employees' corporate du-
ties, ... [where] the employees themselves were sufficiently aware
that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could
obtain legal advice." '84 The Supreme Court in Upjohn recognized that
the communications were: [1] made by Upjohn employees, [2] to coun-
sel for Upjohn acting as such, [3] at the direction of corporate superi-
ors, [4] in order to secure legal advice from counsel [5] within their
scope of employment with the intent to be confidential.85
The Court specifically rejected the use of the control-group test
stating that to hold otherwise "frustrates the very purpose of the privi-
lege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by em-
ployees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the
client corporation. 86 The Supreme Court clearly recognized the reali-
ties of corporate operation and management, saying that "[a]fter the
lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the
Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be given to the corpo-
rate personnel who will apply it."'87
The Upjohn decision also strengthens the attorney-client privilege
by recognizing the underlying purpose behind its application. That pur-
pose is "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients. ... " The Court's understanding of the purpose of
82. Id.
83. The Supreme Court specifically limited its review to a case-by-case analysis
of the scope of the privilege to be applied. Id. at 396.
84. Id. at 394.
85. 449 U.S. at 394. There is striking similarity between this language and that
used by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th
Cir. 1977) (en banc) (1978). See supra text accompanying note 56.
86. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 389.
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the privilege focuses on the fears of the client, providing for a scope
determination only after a balancing of the federal philosophy of com-
plete discovery with the need to protect the client's rights. The Su-
preme Court specifically refused to decide a standard proposition of law
on this matter,89 emphasizing that "to draft a set of rules which should
govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas .. .would violate the
spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501."90
Although a "case-by-case" analysis results in divergent application
of the attorney-corporate client privilege, it also guarantees its contin-
ued existence by enabling the courts to take into consideration the un-
derlying purpose of the privilege; the protection of the client's substan-
tive rights.91
Conclusion
The Upjohn decision, while narrowly drafted, exhibits far reaching
guidelines. Although the Court restricted application of the subject-
matter test to the facts in Upjohn, the basis of their decision, recogniz-
ing the principles underlying the attorney-corporate client privilege,
strengthened the precedential value of that opinion. The Court neither
expressly condemned the control-group test nor sanctioned any other as
a matter of law; rather their reasoning reflects particular emphasis on
the need for any forum deciding privilege questions to pay particular
consideration to balancing the federal philosophy of full disclosure with
the substantive rights of the client. The product of this balance is then
to be filtered upon application through the facts of the case. 92 This two-
part analysis provides first for a determination of the availability of the
privilege as a matter of law, and secondly an evaluation of its applica-
bility to the facts at issue.
By creating this two-step process, the Court has undercut the
strength of the control-group test as a matter of law. While considering
the availability of the attorney-corporate client privilege the Court
seems to be advocating the advantages of the subject-matter test, much
as an adversary would, to the ultimate demise of the control-group test.
89. Id. at 396.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying note 18.




McCollem: The Corporation's Attorney-Client Gamble: Privileged Communicatio
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
I 634 Nova Law Journal 6:1982
Not only has the control-group test become less available as a matter
of law, it has also become less applicable as a matter of fact.93
While the Supreme Court refused to decide a blanket privilege ap-
plicable to all jurisdictions,94 its adamant stance, and argumentative
style seems to have sounded the death knell for the control-group
test.95
Mark R. McCollem
93. See In re Coordinated Pre-Trial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Supreme Court's holding in Upjohn was followed as precedent with respect to the
availability and applicability of the attorney-corporate client privilege. Regarding the
issue of the privileged nature of corporate employee's orientation sessions, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision ordering discovery, citing Upjohn for the
authority that the subject-matter test privileged those communications. The Ninth Cir-
cuit even expanded the holding in Upjohn, holding that "although Upjohn was specifi-
cally limited to current employees . . ., the same rationale applies to the ex-employees
[as well]." 658 F.2d at 1361, n.7. If the Upjohn decision were actually to be limited to
the facts in that case alone, then the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon that decision would
have been unwarranted. This author is of the opinion that the realistic effect of the
Upjohn decision will be to severely limit the application of the control-group test
throughout the federal judiciaries. See also, Leer v. Chicago, Milwaukee St. Paul &
Pacific Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981). The dissent in Leer found the unaniminity
of the Court's decision in Upjohn to be "highly persuasive," with regard to the applica-
bility of the attorney-client privilege to protect depositions taken from switching crew
employees for a railroad company. Id. at 310.
94. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
95. In the interest of complete fairness; for an indication that the control-group
test still thrives, see Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 50 Ill. L.W. 2469 (Ill.
Feb. 16, 1982). The Supreme Court of Illinois applied the control-group test, clearly
recognizing that although the United States Supreme Court in Upjohn found that test
inadequate, the Upjohn decision was limited to its own facts. The Illinois court found
that a broadening of the scope of the privilege beyond the control-group would be "in-
compatible with [their] . . . state's broad discovery policies looking to the ultimate
ascertainment of the truth .. " Id. at 2470.
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